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Abstract—With a constant improvement in the network ar-
chitectures and training methodologies, Neural Networks (NNs)
are increasingly being deployed in real-world Machine Learn-
ing systems. However, despite their impressive performance on
“known inputs”, these NNs can fail absurdly on the “unseen
inputs”, especially if these real-time inputs deviate from the
training dataset distributions, or contain certain types of input
noise. This indicates the low noise tolerance of NNs, which is a
major reason for the recent increase of adversarial attacks. This
is a serious concern, particularly for safety-critical applications,
where inaccurate results lead to dire consequences. We propose a
novel methodology that leverages model checking for the Formal
Analysis of Neural Network (FANNet) under different input noise
ranges. Our methodology allows us to rigorously analyze the noise
tolerance of NNs, their input node sensitivity, and the effects of
training bias on their performance, e.g., in terms of classification
accuracy. For evaluation, we use a feed-forward fully-connected
NN architecture trained for the Leukemia classification. Our
experimental results show ±11% noise tolerance for the given
trained network, identify the most sensitive input nodes, and
confirm the biasness of the available training dataset.
Index Terms—Neural Networks, Formal Methods, Model
Checking, Formal Analysis, Adversarial Machine Learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to their remarkable learning capacity and astounding
accuracy on labelled datasets, Neural Networks (NNs) have
become a ubiquitous paradigm in the Machine Learning (ML)
based smart systems. Several present day applications including
object detectors, speech recognizers, malware detectors, and
even the safety-critical applications like medical diagnosis and
autonomous driving increasingly rely on NNs [1][2]. However,
NNs are extremely sensitive to changes in input, and even the
imperceptible input noise can cause the NN to misclassify [3].
This makes obtaining reliable guarantees regarding correct NN
behavior a significant need.
A standard practice to ensure a good performance of a trained
NN is to test it with a given validation dataset. However,
the applications where NNs are deployed often have infinite
input domain, for instance, when subjected to lifelong learning
scenarios [4]. This makes exhaustive testing infeasible for NNs.
Moreover, the validation datasets are insufficient to generalize
to the vast input domain. This undermines testing as an option
to obtain reliable guarantees regarding the NN.
Intuitively, since formal methods ought to provide reliable
guarantees regarding a system’s behavior, there has been an
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Fig. 1: Overview of FANNet with Novel Contributions for the Formal
Analysis of NN properties, by exploiting Model Checking
increasing interest to use formal methods [5][6] to ascertain
correctness of the trained NNs. However, the non-linearity and
non-convexity of the NNs, along with the NP-completeness
[5] of verifying even the piece-wise linear NNs, makes formal
analysis of NNs an extremely challenging task. The current ob-
jective of formal analysis of NNs is to ensure the robustness of
a trained network in the presence of small input perturbations.
The idea is to ensure that adding perturbations, known as the
adversarial noise, to the network input must not change output
classification of the network.
A. Limitations in State-of-the-Art and Open Challenges
There remains several unresolved problems in the state-
of-the-art regarding formal analysis of NNs (which will be
discussed further in Sections II):
1) The current formal verification frameworks like [7][8]
mostly focus on ensuring network robustness in the presence
of input noise. However, they seldom focus on obtaining the
noise tolerance of the trained NN.
2) The decision making of the NN is often incomprehensible
to humans. The understanding regarding the sensitivity of
the individual NN input nodes, which often lacks in current
works, may provide useful insights to the NN inference.
3) The effects of training bias of a NN deployed in practical
systems are well-studied. However, its effects under input
noise and use formal analysis to ensure fair training proce-
dure remain scarcely studied topics.
B. Our Novel Contributions and Concept Overview
We propose a formal analysis methodology, FANNet, to
address the aforementioned challenges; see Fig. 1. The novel
contributions of this work (elaborated in Sections IV, V) are:
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1) Formal modeling and analysis methodology to analyze the
trained NN as a state-space model, using model checking.
2) Providing realistic estimates for the network tolerance in the
presence of adversarial noise.
3) Studying input node sensitivity in the presence of noise.
4) Analyzing the effects of training bias on network accuracy.
5) Performing a case study on Leukemia Detection to demon-
strate the practical significance of the above analysis.
II. RELATED WORK
Verification for NN Robustness - Verification for ensuring
network robustness, has been an active domain of research for
NNs. These works focus on either: (a) expressing the network
and its robustness property in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF),
and verifying it using a satisfiability (SAT) solver [5][7]–[9],
(b) transforming the problem into a set of linear constraints and
objective function, and verifying the network as an optimization
problem using a linear programming (LP) solver [6][10]–[12],
or (c) using a combination of both SAT and LP solvers [13],
under a specified Lp − norm space around the seed inputs.
Unlike the current literature, we analyze NN properties beyond
network robustness, using model checking.
Training Bias and Input Node Sensitivity - Biased training
data is among the leading causes for a biased NN [14]. To solve
the problem, either specialized training algorithms are proposed
[15][16], or formal analysis is used to ensure fairness of the
NN [17] in presence of larger (observable) bias. On the other
hand, the literature focusing on input node sensitivity of NN
[18][19] generally aims either to identify input features that can
be pruned out of the network without hampering the network
performance, in the absence of noise, or use input noise to
study nodes’ response for selection of input features [20][21].
Our work, on the other hand, takes a more qualitative approach
with input sensitivity, and identifies the input nodes that require
precise input acquisition to avoid misclassification.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section provides the background knowledge on basic
NN concepts and properties necessary to understand our novel
contributions. The notations introduced in this section will be
followed in the subsequent sections.
A. Neural Network and its Properties
We consider feed-forward network, with L fully-connected
(FC) layers, each containing N neurons. Each neuron of a
layer is connected to all neurons of the previous layer with
a deterministic relation between inputs, the associated weight
matrix w and the bias vector b. The overall network is given
by f(x) : x → xL−1, where x and xL−1 represent input and
output layers of the network respectively.
Except the input layer, each layer is associated with a
non-linear activation function σ. The most common activation
functions are: Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU), maxpool, sigmoid
and softmax. In this paper, we focus on ReLU and maxpool
activations due to their predominant use in practical NNs
recently [22].
Robustness is an essential property of a NN that determines
its sturdiness in the presence of small noise ∆x. A network is
said to be robust if the addition of ∆x to the input x does not
change the predicted output label:
x′ = x+ ∆x : |x− x′| <  =⇒ f(x′) = f(x) (1)
Noise Tolerance defines the minimum noise (∆x)min added
to the input x, such that the addition of any further noise causes
the network to misclassify the input. Alternatively, it determines
the maximum noise (∆x)max that could be added to the input
x, for which the network output equals the true label for the
input x, i.e., Sx:
x′ = x+ (∆x)max : f(x′) = Sx (2)
Input Node Sensitivity indicates the robustness of individual
input nodes to the input perturbations. The neurons (or nodes)
in the input layer typically represent distinct, although often
correlated, features of the input. An input node x0a is said to
be insensitive to a small noise α, if the addition of this noise
does not change the predicted output label:
f((x0a + α), (x
0
b)) = f(x
0),
x0 = [x01, ..., x
0
N ], x
0
b = x
0 \ x0a, a ∈ [1, 2, ..., N ],
(3)
Training Bias is generally the result of a biased training
dataset, i.e., a dataset with more samples pointing to a certain
output label, which often retains even for the unseen inputs.
Formally, it can be expressed as a network property, where the
addition of noise ∆x changes the output label for an input X1,
but not for input X2:
f(X1 + ∆x) 6= SX1 ∧ f(X2 + ∆x) = SX2 (4)
B. Model Checking using nuXmv
Model checking is a formal analysis technique that enables
rigorous verification of the system model defined as a state-
space. The standard procedure used during model checking
includes the representation of system and its properties in the
formal language of the model checker. Model checker then
searches the system’s state-space either to ensure functional
correctness or to find counterexamples in case of failure of the
desired properties. The model checkers can either be based on
Satisfiability solvers (SAT/SMT) or Binary Decision Diagrams
(BDDs). BDD-based model checkers are limited by space
due to their PSPACE-complete computational complexity. On
the other hand, SAT-based model checkers, despite their NP-
complete computational complexity, can handle larger number
of variables. As will be shown in Section V, the state-space
of NN, in the presence of noise, can grow exponentially.
Hence, the SMT-based symbolic model checker, nuXmv [23],
is an appropriate tool for our experiments. It supports both
discrete and continuous domains, including real numbers R and
unbounded integers Z, and allows the use of propositional and
temporal logics.
IV. FANNET: OUR METHODOLOGY FOR THE FORMAL
ANALYSIS OF NEURAL NETWORK PROPERTIES
Fig. 2 provides a comprehensive view of our FANNet
methodology comprised of the following three key procedures.
A. Behavior Extraction
The NN testing samples (X) and their true labels (Sx) are
available at the input. In this step, the weights (w1, w2) and
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Fig. 2: FANNet: A Methodology for Formally Analyzing Neural Network Properties using Model Checking
activations of the trained NN, which determine the network’s
architecture and functionality, are first translated into the SMV
model and the Temporal properties, using the formal language
of the model checker. Prior to the analysis with input noise,
the correctness of the NN model without noise is ensured by
comparing the model’s calculated outputs (OC) against Sx, i.e.,
P1 in Fig. 2.
B. Noise Tolerance Analysis
The formal analysis for noise tolerance, proceeds as follows:
1) A large noise range for the analysis is initialized. From
this specified range, a unique noise vector (NV ) is non-
deterministically selected in each iteration.
2) Noise is added relatively to the input, and the input then
transverses through the network layers.
3) OCn is then computed and compared to Sx of the input.
Until counterexamples to OCn = Sx (i.e., P2 in Fig. 2)
are available, the noise is reduced iteratively. As soon as P2
becomes true, the noise tolerance of the NN is obtained.
4) The process is repeated for all inputs in the dataset.
C. Adversarial Noise Vector Extraction
If OCn = Sx and the NV is not already contained in e, then
the NV obtained from the generated counterexample is added
to e, as shown by P3 in Fig. 2. This ensures that e is an array
of unqiue noise patterns to which the NN is vulnerable.
V. CASE STUDY ON LEUKEMIA DIAGNOSIS
A. Problem Description
We considered a feed-forward FC neural network architecture
as shown in Fig. 3. It comprises of an input layer, one hidden
layer and an output layer, with 6, 20 and 2 nodes respectively.
The activations used in the network are ReLU and Maxpooling.
We trained the network1 to diagnose leukemia using the stan-
dard Leukemia database [24], consisting of 38 training samples
and 34 testing samples containing genetic attributes for Acute
Lymphoblast Leukemia (ALL) and Acute Myeloid Leukemia
(AML). In total, each data sample has 7129 of these genetic
1The network is trained using MATLAB with a learning rate of 0.5 for the
40 initial epochs, and a learning rate of 0.2 for the remaining 40 epochs. The
training accuracy of the network is 100% and the testing accuracy is 94.12%
𝑥1
𝑥5
𝑛2 𝐿1
𝐿0
Input Layer              Hidden Layer Output Layer
(a)
⟨ 𝐿0≥ 𝐿1 → 𝐿0,
𝐿1 ≥ 𝐿0 → 𝐿1⟩
State Space with Noise 
in given NN grows:
- from 3 to 65 states
- from 6 to 4160
transitions
Network Equations State Space expands 
Exponentially with Noise
𝐹𝐶: 𝑛1 ← 𝑏 + σ𝑖=1
5 𝑤𝑘. 𝑖𝑘
𝑅𝑒𝐿𝑈: 𝑎1 ← 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑛1)
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙: 𝑎2 ← 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑛0, … , 𝑛20 )
𝑛20
𝑛1
𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
1
𝑖1 ∈ ℤ
𝑖5 ∈ ℤ
. . . 
. . . 
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙
S1
𝐿0
S2
𝐿1
S3 𝑡1
𝑡6 𝑡3
𝑡5
𝑡4
𝑡2
(c)
𝐿1
…
S64
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙
S1
𝐿0
S2 S65
𝑡65
S3
𝑡4160
𝑡128
𝑡4907
𝑡3978
…
𝑡2 𝑡63 𝑡64𝑡1
𝑡4906
(b)
Fig. 3: (a) Feed-forward FC-NN trained for Leukemia Classification;
(b) FSM for the given NN, in the absence of input noise; (c) FSM for
NN with Noise Range [0, 1]%
attributes. From these, the top five most significant genes are
picked as NN inputs using the Minimum Redundancy and
Maximum Relevance (mRMR) feature selection method [25].
B. FANNet Implementation
Varying noise ranges were input to the network, as explained
in the previous section. The main goals of the analysis are:
(a) to determine noise tolerance for the given network by
gradually reducing the applied noise ∆x until no noise pattern
that causes the true label Sx to change can be found, and (b)
to study network properties like training bias and input node
sensitivity on the basis of the obtained counterexamples. It must
also be highlighted that the objective of this work is not to
exhaustively search for counterexamples, but rather to explore
network properties on the basis of obtained counterexamples.
C. Formal Analysis of the Neural Network Properties
We initiate the experiment using nuXmv with a large input
noise, and gradually reduce the noise until nuXmv can verify
the absence of any counterexamples for the given noise. The
observations and analysis from our experiments, as illustrated
in Fig. 4, are as follows:
1) Noise Tolerance: For all the correctly classified inputs
in the testing dataset, addition of a noise ±11% or less does
not trigger misclassification for the given NN. Hence, assuming
input noise to be the integer percentage values, the given NN
has an estimated noise tolerance of ±11%.
2) Classification Boundary Estimation: A few inputs
among the dataset (i.e., inputs closer to the classification
boundary) were observed to be highly susceptible to input noise.
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Fig. 4: Estimated Noise Tolerance, Impact of Noise on inputs closer to Classification Boundary, Effects of Training bias on NN Accuracy, and
Sensitivity of specific Input Nodes
On the other hand, for other inputs, noise even as large as 50%
of the input did not trigger misclassification at the output. This
knowledge can be used to estimate the network’s classification
boundary in the hyperspace.
3) Training Bias: Inputs with Sx = L0 were observed as
more likely to be misclassified than the inputs with Sx = L1.
On a closer inspection of the training dataset, it is observed
that approximately 70% of the data samples belong to the
output class L1 i.e., the training is biased towards the output
L1. This is corroborated by our formal analysis, where the
misclassification of inputs with true output L0 is more probable
than the misclassification of inputs with true output L1.
4) Input Node Sensitivity: No counterexamples were ob-
tained with positive noise at input node i5. Moreover, the coun-
terexamples suggest more noise patterns with positive noise
at input node i2 than the other way around. The knowledge
of the input node sensitivity, in some applications, could be
exploited in the design of variable-precision data acquisition
methodologies, where the resource-greedy measurements could
be reserved for obtaining the sensitive inputs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Input noise is known to trigger output misclassification in
Neural Networks (NNs). Traditionally, the formal analysis of
NNs focuses on checking network robustness for different
Lp−norm bounded noise. However, other network properties,
i.e., network tolerance, training bias, and input node sensitivity,
affecting NN’s performance and are often neglected. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first model checking based
formal analysis methodology that aims at investigating these
properties affecting NNs. We use our methodology to estimate
noise tolerance for a NN trained for Leukemia classification,
to investigate training bias in the network due to the biased
dataset, and to explore the sensitivity of the different genetic
attributes presented by network’s input nodes.
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